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Statesmanship 
David Craig 
 
In 1921 James Bryce observed in Modern Democracies how ‘extremely small is the number 
of persons by whom the world is governed’ and that free government was always ‘an 
Oligarchy within a Democracy’.1 Accordingly, a major theme in the historiography of Britain 
has been whether ‘modernisation’ was helped or hindered by its largely aristocratic elite, and 
how that elite adapted itself to the process.
2
 This concern has led in two directions: 
assessments of the economic and political power of the elite, and studies of how far political 
decisions were impervious to democratic pressure. The latter trend has, in recent years, turned 
its attention to the role of ‘ideals’ and ‘values’ in the behaviour of politicians.3 There are now 
important works examining, for instance, the way that leaders tried to mobilise and 
manipulate wider bodies of opinion; the heroic or tragic narratives of national history in 
which they located their political personas; and the deeper – sometimes anxious – gendered 
assumptions about the status of ‘public men’.4 What, generally, has not been explored was 
how leadership itself was understood at the time.
5
 A political leader existed within a network 
of assumptions of what leadership was – these could be resources to draw upon, but they 
were also constraints which constituted an ideal and a form of evaluation. This chapter 
considers five aspects of statesmanship, beginning with its relationship to governance. It then 
explores the essential requirements of statesmen, that they possess both principles and 
judgment. The final section examines the important role of character, and also the necessity 
of communication skills – pre-eminently oratory. These were the elements of statesmanship: 
as Bryce argued, since the people themselves did not rule, ‘a nation is tested and judged by 
the quality of those it chooses and supports as its leaders; and by their capacity it stands or 
falls’.6 
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Definitions 
 
It may be useful to begin with terminology. While the word ‘statesman’ had an ancestry 
going back to the sixteenth century, ‘statesmanship’ was a recent coinage which appeared 
with increasing frequency from the 1830s and enjoyed its heyday between the 1880s and 
1930s, before steeply declining thereafter.
7
 The word referred to political leadership and the 
qualities by which it was marked. It was also a strongly idealised concept, as is apparent from 
the reaction to one of the few guides that explicitly addressed its scope and functions. First 
published in 1836, Henry Taylor’s The Statesman argued that most writers on government 
were concerned with ‘the structure of communities and the nature of political powers and 
institutions’ and had little to say about the ‘art of exercising political functions’ unless – like 
Machiavelli, Bacon and Burke – they had themselves direct political experience.8 The 
reception of the work was telling. While it was agreed that there was a real need for a work 
which delineated the ideal of a statesman, Taylor’s book was not it. One reviewer thought it 
should have been called The Minister rather than The Statesman, and ‘of the wide distinction 
which may exist between these terms, the world has had frequent and melancholy proof’.9 
The problem was that Taylor seemed more concerned with advising a politician how to get 
and keep office – ‘the arts of rising’ – than with teaching him the performance of his duty.10 
Such a man was ‘destitute of all principle’ except the ‘love of place and power’, and, 
inevitably, this led to Taylor being charged with Machiavellianism.
11
 While this was not a 
fair account of the work, it does show that, first, anxiety about unmerited privilege remained 
strong in the 1830s, and second, that the concept of ‘statesman’ was widely conceived in 
idealised terms that required it to be distinguished from the mundane ambition and 
pragmatism of ordinary politicians. 
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In addition, there was also a revealing tension between the ‘statesman-as-hero’ and 
the ‘statesman-as-common man’. This can best be seen by comparing Carlyle and Bagehot. 
Carlyle wanted a hero who could transcend the limits of his time and to whom ‘our wills are 
to be subordinated’. Such a man was the key to ‘perfect government’ and ‘no ballot-box, 
parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery whatsoever can 
improve it a whit’.12 To some degree this chimed with the mood of crisis in the early 1840s – 
both Gladstone and Disraeli, in differing ways, can be found hankering for a deeper sense of 
leadership and government.
13
 Yet by 1850, when the Latter-Day Pamphlets were published, 
it seemed out-of-place. This tirade against parliamentary government insisted it was foolish 
to expect ‘heroic wisdom’ in parliamentarians, and that the best hope was a statesman who 
could ‘shape the dim tendencies of Parliament, and guide them wisely to the goal’.14 The fact 
that Carlyle believed Peel was such a man should not disguise how idiosyncratic the position 
had become. A safer guide is Bagehot, not least because he understood that statesmen had to 
work within the constraints of parliamentary government. In the mid 1850s he noted the 
persistent calls for a ‘great statesman’ to replace the Aberdeen coalition, but argued that 
while men like Alexander and Napoleon might suit nations with an ‘imperial disposition’ 
they would be out of place in Britain except at times of genuine emergency.
15
 What was 
needed were statesmen in tune with the ordinary man on the omnibus and who understood the 
nature of parliamentary government. Carlyle might hate the ‘jangling, talking, and arguing’ 
of Parliament, but these were in fact its lifeblood: ‘a dictator will not save us – we require 
discussion, explanation, controversy’.16 When Disraeli lambasted a previous generation as 
‘arch mediocrities’, Bagehot thought it something of a compliment.17 
We must look to the various commentaries on leading politicians in order to tease out 
the assumptions that underlay the language of statesmanship. It was widely thought that 
biography was a peculiarly instructive literary form, a belief that culminated in the Dictionary 
4 
 
of National Biography at the end of the century. Samuel Smiles’s popular oeuvre of works 
almost entirely depended on biographical portraits of worthies, and even J. R. Seeley 
conceded that while the ‘real subject’ of history was the state, not the individual, nevertheless 
‘useful knowledge’ was best diffused to the wider populace through biographies of famous 
men.
18
 Various series such as ‘Twelve English Statesman’ and ‘The Queen’s Prime 
Ministers’ were only the tip of an enormous iceberg of sketches, portraits, essays, obituaries 
and biographies which took interest in the ‘characters of public men’.19 For the purposes of 
this essay, it does not matter whether these works succumbed to hagiography, nor whether 
their judgments of political successes and failures were accurate – indeed, it is striking how 
quickly reputations were born which have subsequently taken considerable historical effort to 
dislodge.
20
 The aim here is not to judge statesmen but rather to illuminate the terms by which 
they were judged, and the ideals to which they ought to have aspired. 
 
Governance 
 
The nineteenth century saw a dramatic growth in government: the range of responsibility and 
complexity of business of the state grew with increasing rapidity, and placed pressures on a 
creaking bureaucracy and its departmental heads. Inevitably this meant more attention was 
focused on the duties of statesmanship. In the main, to be a statesman required effective 
holding of office. The definition of the term could slip: supporters of Fox always claimed he 
was a statesman, though others wondered whether he had ever really proven himself as a 
leader in office. Melbourne was commonly judged to have had ‘little aptitude for public 
business’ and hence, some concluded, could not be esteemed a great statesman. Lord 
Aberdeen, similarly, was blamed for an ‘administrative incapacity’ that impaired his 
reputation.
21
 Bright represents an important case: a first-rate orator, and, by his death, 
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recognised as a powerful politician, it was still agreed that he was an inferior administrator 
whose brief tenures in office were largely unsuccessful. Hence, as The Standard put it, he 
was not ‘and did not profess to be, a great Statesman’. Such a person had to have ‘the power 
of governing, of conducting administrative and legislative affairs, and of getting people to act 
under him, and with him’.22 These abilities were central to the statesman. Doubts, for 
instance, were expressed about Disraeli. Bagehot commented that he would himself ‘smile’ to 
have been called a successful administrator, and his majority government seemed to show he 
had no real sense of what to do with power. That part of his mind intended for business and 
detail – ‘the solid part’ – was under-developed.23 Even otherwise eulogistic obituaries 
conceded this point, and Froude, one of his biographers, concluded that few of his measures 
had lasted, and in that respect he could not claim to be a great statesman.
24
 
The poor quality of statesmanship was a recurring theme in the first half of the 
century which the arrival of Reform – and with it aristocratic Whiggery – did not entirely 
address. As the scope of the state increased there was mounting suspicion that the traditional 
elite was not up to the task. If in the 1770s Burke’s linking of good government with 
aristocratic families seemed plausible, by the 1830s it was under challenge: Reform might 
have prevented executive dominance of Parliament, but it did not seem to have eradicated 
aristocratic patronage or infused government with a more vigorous sense of its potential.
25
 
These concerns – waxing and waning, but never disappearing – continued into the 1850s, and 
came to a head during the Crimean crisis.
26
 Ironically, it was the Whig governments that 
particularly attracted criticism, whether it was Melbourne’s indolence in the 30s or Russell’s 
exclusiveness in the 40s and early 50s. The idea that government remained a nest of 
incompetence – and an aristocratic racket besides – was close to the heart of various forms of 
middle-class reformism in the 1850s. 
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Broadly speaking, there were two connected lines of criticism. The first was the 
radical argument that, while the aristocracy had a ‘paralyzing grasp’ over statesmanship, it 
had shown time and again that it was not up to the task. The reforms of the 1830s had only 
gone a little way to addressing the problem.
27
 Although radicals continued to press this point 
in the 1840s and 50s, they were not alone in raising question marks over the adequacy of the 
aristocracy. Bagehot, for instance, made the interesting argument that in reality the ‘heavy 
lifting’ had for a long time not been performed by the landed elite: they ‘will rarely do the 
work, and can rarely do the work’. The daily grind of government was ‘too much for refined 
habits, delicate administration, anxious judgment’ which their style of life nurtured.28 One 
solution – for instance in Taylor’s Statesman – was to give more attention to the training of 
rising politicians. They should be settled in office as early as possible, in order to acquire a 
‘capacity for taking decisions’, and to learn that drudgery was essential to teach patience and 
application.
29
 In this, at least, the Westminster Review agreed, thinking an improvement in the 
‘character’ and ‘abilities’ of politicians a start, to which should be added knowledge of 
political economy and moral philosophy.
30
 More generally it was argued that there needed to 
be more middle-class men in Parliament, and radicals sought various measure of 
administrative and constitutional reform to that end.  
This led into the second line of criticism which focused less on character and class 
than on the inherited structures of government. Taylor thought that there was something 
‘fatally amiss in the very idea of statesmanship’ because constant parliamentary pressure on 
ministerial activity undermined incentives to implement constructive reform: it was 
invariably more trouble than it was worth. His solution was to increase the number of 
permanent under-secretaries in a department, and transfer to them as much routine business 
as possible, and so freeing the parliamentary heads to become ‘efficient statesmen’.31 Nearly 
two decades later W. R. Greg – a leading member of the industrial elite in Manchester – 
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reflected on the apparently poor ‘Prospects of British Statesmanship’. While it was customary 
to blame this on the exclusivity of the aristocracy, he doubted whether simply increasing the 
number of middle-class men in Parliament would be effective, because too few of them really 
had the skills requisite of a statesman. The problem ultimately lay in the way that Parliament 
had evolved. As it ceased to be a body designed to represent grievances and defend liberties, 
so it had less need of ‘orators and legislators’. Instead it needed ‘capable administrators’ who 
could counteract its ‘tedious, ponderous, and inefficient’ tendencies.32 One solution was to 
enable the sovereign to choose ministers from any rank and profession of life: they would 
have parliamentary seats but not votes. In effect administration would be revived by 
circumventing parliamentary government. Greg also adapted Taylor’s proposals about 
bureaucratic reform, and argued for more active departmental committees to consider plans 
and to advise ministers. 
While such criticisms seemed fraught during times of crisis, they tended to recede 
once the panic had passed. Palmerston’s confident charm seemed to beguile the nation over 
the next ten years. In any case, some commentators argued that the lineaments of a solution 
could be seen in the statesmanship of Peel. Despite – as we shall see – intense criticism of his 
career as a whole, it was widely agreed that he was an exemplary administrator. If he lacked 
the ‘grandeur of the patriot-hero’ he more than made up for it by being a man of business.33 
This was the nub of Bagehot’s argument as well. Since the late eighteenth century the landed 
elite realised it was temperamentally ill-suited to administration and came to rely on ‘men of 
a somewhat lower grade’ whose ambition and aptitude suited them to government, but who 
were still sufficiently gentlemanly not to offend that elite. As the middle classes grew in 
strength and demanded government in accordance with notions they were familiar with, they 
found in Peel the ‘plain sense’ they required. Hence he switched from being the ‘the nominee 
of a nobility’ to the ‘representative of a transacting and trading multitude’.34 In a different 
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way even Palmerston seemed to show that aristocrats were capable of leadership. If in private 
some politicians had their doubts (‘not a good man for general business’), by the time of his 
death he was being depicted as an ‘energetic statesman’ who had a ‘business-like’ talent for 
administration without the pedantry.
35
 Whether or not these claims convinced, it is striking 
that they could be applied to Palmerston without incurring ridicule, and that the ‘business-
faculty’ could be found in an aristocratic dandy. 
The second half of the century saw a shift of anxiety. Bagehot signalled this in various 
criticisms of administrative reformers. While he agreed that business-men had a greater 
capacity for ‘action and work’ than most country gentlemen, therein lay a problem: they often 
lacked the breadth of judgment to know when to act and when not to act. Accustomed to 
directing affairs for themselves, they disliked sharing power with a permanent official, and 
could not see that their job was largely one of co-ordinating the office. In parliamentary 
government ‘excessive action is almost as great an evil as gross incompetence’, and there was 
something, therefore, to be said for ‘aristocratic laissez-aller’.36 This theme is illuminated 
clearly by a comparison between Gladstone and Salisbury. The former, it was agreed, had an 
enormous capacity for administration: he could combine the largest of principles with the 
trickiest of details, and deftly oversee a torrent of legislation.
37
 Yet he was often seen as 
‘unsafe’.38 By the early 1870s some judged him incapable of ‘calm and moderation’, and 
various writers put this down to his business background – he was ‘interested too much’ in 
everything that came across his path.
39
 Unsurprisingly this unease matured in the following 
decade, and later assessments frequently noted that his ‘boundless energy’ could sometimes 
over-ripen into autocratic will.
40
 Salisbury’s style was very different. He lacked the visionary 
ideals of his opponent, and deliberately buried himself at the Foreign Office in order to 
detach himself from popular enthusiasms. Yet ‘he possessed that capacity for government 
and guidance which is ... the most indispensable quality in a statesman’. Indeed his skill was 
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in calming and controlling the very passions his antagonist had unleashed. The Times 
concluded that he exemplified aristocratic virtues and that ‘in the aristocracy and gentry of 
England are preserved incomparable resources for the guidance and government of the 
nation. The more democratic a Constitution becomes, the more essential to it are leadership 
and guidance, authority and control’.41 The reputation of aristocrats as statesmen had not 
come full circle, but it is notable that the arrival of populism and democracy provided the 
space in which aristocratic indifference could be repackaged as statesmanlike detachment. 
 
Principles and Judgment 
 
The central question, of course, was what statesmen wanted to do with their leadership. Here 
the ideal of a principled political career in the service of the nation was always being 
threatened by the suspicion that selfish ends and nefarious means might lay behind a facade. 
The shadow cast by early modern raison d’état was a very long one, and the statesmanship 
pioneered by Richelieu and Olivares – with its justification of deceit and cunning – hardly sat 
easily in an age of religious seriousness. Indeed it was widely thought that the preceding two 
centuries had manifested fairly low standards of political morality.
42
 The question of 
consistency of principle was therefore a central one which touched on the broader concerns of 
honesty and hypocrisy in politics.
43
 Macaulay argued that for the mass of the populace ‘the 
test of integrity in a public man is consistency’ and while not a perfect barometer of 
character, it was a good one.
44
 Similarly, Smiles insisted that honesty of purpose needed to be 
linked to ‘sound principles’ and that a man lacking them was like a ship without compass or 
rudder. Indeed, he feared that democratic pressures were encouraging politicians to pander to 
the public and loosen their consciences. All around him he saw ‘diplomacy, expediency, and 
moral reservation ... equivocation or moral dodging – twisting and so stating the things as to 
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convey a false impression’.45 The statesman had to find a way to balance his principles with 
the flexibility his situation  required. 
The estimate of statesmen always included some discussion of principle and integrity. 
Some were particularly commended in this regard: all obituarists commented on Grey’s 
‘boasted consistency’ and that he would have sacrificed objects of ambition if they clashed 
with his principles.
46
 Russell, similarly, was viewed as consistent, though there was a danger 
that he could be ‘intolerant as well as unbending’.47 Conversely, some politicians were 
presumed to fall short of the ideal. Palmerston was accused of ‘indifference to principles’ – 
evident in his switching of parties – and yet this could be explained away in terms of his 
patriotism.
48
 Disraeli was less fortunate, and the charge of being unprincipled never went 
away – an adventurer ‘without fixed principles’, he ‘never had a political faith’.49 Trollope 
did not even accuse him of hypocrisy, because that at least implied there were some private 
beliefs being concealed.
50
  
 The more complex cases were those where politicians made a point of having 
principles and yet seemed to change them at particular moments. Peel was perhaps the most 
notorious case because of his change of stance on both Catholic emancipation in 1829, and 
Corn Law repeal in 1846. Lengthy discussions tried to prove he was in reality totally devoid 
of principles, and that his policy was simply whatever was convenient for himself, a man 
whose ‘idol was power’.51 As Greg noted in Peel’s defence, the charge of ‘treachery and 
tergiversation’ was always thought damning because inconsistency was presumed fatal to the 
character of a politician.
52
 The supporters of Peel instead made the case that these changes of 
policy were proof that he served the needs of the nation even at the cost of his own career 
(though some thought questions of honour to his party were at stake in remaining in office to 
repeal the Corn Laws).
53
 Yet this was not entirely easy to swallow: The Times was not alone 
in suggesting that Peel had inaugurated the ‘unpalatable truth’ that principle must ‘give way 
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to what he called “expediency”’.54 The question was, expedient for whom – his own 
ambition, or the whole nation? Similar problems pervaded Gladstone’s career, but he tried to 
pre-empt critics by explaining his changed positions at some length, for instance in two 
separate autobiographical publications.
55
 It was a common observation that his style of 
argument was oblique, subtle, tortured.
 
As early as 1859 one perceptive critic argued that on 
any given question ‘Mr Gladstone’s former self’ was always his strongest adversary and that 
a career of such ‘instability’ would have led to ridicule had not the intellect been so 
impressive: a mind ‘so forcible in its faculties’ and yet ‘so facile in conversion’ was worthy 
of study.
56
 Bagehot noted that Gladstone’s temperamental intensity, which attracted him to 
strong statements of principle, coupled with a scholastic intellect, meant he was forever 
proliferating arguments and splitting hairs to make the evolution of his positions seem 
consistent.
57
 The point was affirmed in obituaries: the Daily News commented on the painful 
struggles Gladstone went through to avoid the charge of acting from ‘interested motives’. ‘It 
was not that he was inconsistent; he himself said and believed that a painful consistency had 
been the characteristic feature of his life.’58 The danger, as Bryce suggested, was that because 
he could both respond to critics, and persuade himself of anything, he could to opponents and 
followers alike, seem dangerously erratic.
59
  
 Even the highest-minded statesmen struggled to reconcile the expectation of principle 
with the reality of politics. Some commentators therefore asked their readers to judge whether 
it was possible for any politician never to have changed their position. Ritchie, responding to 
the criticism that Disraeli lacked principles, asked ‘Well, what eminent MP has? ... The best 
statesman in modern times is he who is least hampered by principles, and is free to follow the 
leading of public opinion.’60 A point commonly made was that the very structure of 
parliamentary government made pure consistency, if not impossible, then certainly 
ineffective. Burke had famously castigated the independent member who preserved his 
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conscience at the expense of achieving nothing, and instead defended the essential nature of 
party.
61
 A related issue concerned cabinet unity: surely it was impossible to believe that a 
comparatively large number of men could agree wholeheartedly on any given issue, and so it 
was inevitable that individuals would need to set aside their personal beliefs from time to 
time.
62
 Taking this idea further, Bagehot argued that office placed so many conflicting 
demands on politicians that ‘those subject to it have no opinions’ beyond the most general of 
views. Again and again statesmen had not only to make arguments that they did not think 
conclusive, but ‘to defend opinions which they do not believe to be true’. Ironically, the need 
to seem convinced of a policy at one time, and then, at a later time, to embrace its opposite 
gave the impression of ‘great apparent changes of opinion’.63 The pressure of cabinet unity 
therefore created graver problems of inconsistency than were really the case. Greg argued 
that the reason why this seemed a problem was that in the eighteenth century Parliament had 
been a forum where politicians contended for mastery and in which changes of party arose 
from dubious motives, and so inconsistency was seen as a question of personal honour. Since 
then, however, Parliament had become a body of legislators designed to serve the needs of 
the nation. Yes, politicians needed to demonstrate a form of constancy – steadiness of 
purpose, largeness of vision – but not at the cost of flexibility. The very system required that 
politicians have an ‘open and earnest convincability’.64 
 These structural explanations, however, did not dissolve the ethical anxieties. Taylor 
contrasted those who thought the virtues of private life must be carried into politics with 
those who deemed ‘Necessity’ – or expediency – to be justified. His solution was to argue 
that in terms of beneficial consequences it was better to relax the ‘law of truth’ in politics 
than to insist on it. Moralists must permit statesmen ‘a free judgment ... though a most 
responsible one, in the weighing of specific against general evil’.65 This did not satisfy 
reviewers. Some thought this little different from Machiavellianism and insisted that private 
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morality must be the basis for political conduct, while others were puzzled why Taylor 
seemed to support utilitarianism in public but not private life.
66
 A comparison of the ‘Ethics 
of Statesmanship’, as exemplified by the careers of Peel and Palmerston, also revealed some 
of these anxieties. Peel’s seeming abandonment of principles led to the charge of expediency, 
and yet Palmerston’s popularity did not suffer when he boasted that expediency was ‘the one 
actuating motive of his public policy’. While the author agreed that the private life of a 
politician was no reflection of his public ability, he could not endorse Buckle’s argument that 
the business of a statesman was to act ‘not according to his own principles, but according to 
the wishes of the people’. The conscience should not be over-ridden by the public will, and a 
statesman who simply took instructions ‘should not call his proceedings statesmanship nor 
should object if others call them “unprincipled”’. 67 Without a strong faith in expediency, and 
yet aware that pure consistency was unrealistic, the public was ultimately expected to put its 
trust in the judgment of politicians. 
Although widely seen as a central aspect of successful statesmanship, political 
judgment was not easy to define. It may be helpful to look first at those politicians thought 
lacking in this quality. A telling example was Bagehot’s study of Lord Bolingbroke. Here 
was a man ‘exceedingly defective in cool and plain judgment’ largely because his style of 
life, coupled with a warm nature and excitable imagination tended to make him ‘erratic not 
only in conduct but in judgment’.68 Such flaws were evident in the nineteenth century as well. 
Canning was occasionally thought too excitable, and Derby was often criticised for 
impatience and impulsiveness. Indeed one biographer thought him similar to Bolingbroke in 
this regard. Certainly it was thought to have impaired his statesmanship.
69
 To a lesser degree, 
Gladstone seemed sometimes to show similar failings: he too was thought ‘impulsive’ and 
‘imprudent’, although this was the result of the intensity of his convictions – whatever they 
happened to be.
70
 By contrast, the ideal statesman – according to Taylor – needed to acquire 
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calmness, order and equanimity as the necessary basis of judgment.
71
 In particular, there 
needed to be the right mixture of decisiveness of reason and decisiveness of temperament. 
The ‘reasoning and contemplative faculty’ was obviously essential, and in the case of a 
complex question, the statesman needed to begin with a fairly open mind, and be able to 
suspend his judgment until he had got a good sense of its ‘proportions and relations’. The 
man incapable of deliberation tended to make erroneous decisions. But, on its own, reason 
tended to multiply doubts, and so a temperament suited to making decisions was needed to 
‘abbreviate the operations of reason and close up the distances, thereby enabling the mind, 
where many things are doubtful, to seize decisively those which are least so’. So, in the early 
stages of a political issue, the statesman was permitted ‘patience and circumspection’ before 
striking with ‘energy’ towards the end.72  
In broad strokes, this was the template for judging real statesmen. First, they needed 
to be able to access relevant knowledge. Of course, much attention was given to the 
education of statesmen, and – as we have seen – to the importance of mastering office. In 
addition, an understanding of the state of public opinion was a useful asset. While Wellington 
was a failure in this respect, Peel, it was thought, had a ‘quick and instinctive’ perception of 
the state of opinion and an unrivalled ability to tell which popular leaders mattered.
73
 
Similarly, Palmerston was credited with an understanding of the feelings of ‘England’, while 
Disraeli, conversely, was thought to be rather weak in assessing opinion outside Parliament. 
Gladstone – whether seen as a follower or leader of opinion – was at least credited with being 
open to fresh ideas.
74
 Second, statesmen needed to consider a question appropriately. Peel 
was commended for being a practical statesman, rather than a ‘star-gazer’, who could assess 
every difficulty and foresee every objection.
75
 Palmerston, also, took little interest in 
speculations about the future and had ‘a head cool enough to weigh cautiously and accurately 
even his own political projects’.76 He had a ‘lucid, well-balanced, rapid grasp’ of all aspects 
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of a subject which enabled him to focus on the matter in hand.
77
 Gladstone’s ability to see all 
sides of a question was also frequently commented on, though – as W. E. Forster once said – 
since he could persuade himself of nearly anything this skill could also be put to perilous use. 
By contrast – for The Times at least – Lord Salisbury provided a steady hand and a clear 
vision as prime minister.
78 
When it came to acting on a decision, there appears to have been a balance between 
extremes. On the one hand, a measure of caution and moderation was always desirable and 
routinely praised. Once again, Peel was exemplary: his caution was the consequence ‘not of 
timidity, but of prudence’; he was ‘moderate by taste, his instinctive preference was always 
for a middle course: he disliked rashness and shrank from risk’. He was a ‘tentative’ 
politician who always felt his way forward step-by-step.
79
 But this virtue could be seen as a 
vice. Lord Aberdeen’s caution meant that his nature was ‘critical rather than practical, more 
capable of seeing what it was wrong, than of resolving what it was right do’. While Gladstone 
credited him with a strong ‘deliberative faculty’, critics thought him ‘not a good driver, and 
when the horses grew restive and kicked over the trace, he lacked nerve, hesitated, and was 
lost’.80 On the other hand, statesmen were also praised for their courage. Peel showed 
‘boldness, tempered by sagacity’, and Palmerston was commonly lauded for his ‘will’, 
‘fortitude’ and ‘determination’.81 Disraeli’s entire career had shown ‘high courage’, though 
some wondered whether this had been more for party advantage than national interest.
82
 But 
courage also had its vices: Russell’s widely acknowledged fearlessness meant that he was 
often unwilling to take advice, and became increasingly liable to lapses of judgment in the 
1850s. The dangers of recklessness were all too apparent in Derby – as we have seen – and 
Gladstone had something of, if not ‘the rashness’ then ‘the boldness’ of the Liverpudlian.83 
Even Lord Salisbury was thought prone to impulsiveness until his leadership in the 1880s 
proved otherwise. A further danger was vacillation – politicians who lurched from one 
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extreme position to another. James Graham was thought as ‘unstable as water’, a man who 
‘oddly blended’ both rashness and timidity in his nature.84 
The final aspect of judgment worth considering is foresight. While highly desirable, it 
was unclear whether this was a quality which could be acquired or whether it was, ultimately, 
the result of good fortune. Peel, according to one critic, lacked ‘sagacious foresight’, but, 
conversely, a supporter argued that while he did not have a ‘prophetic mind’ that could see 
far into the future – as, perhaps, the elder Pitt had – he still qualified as a statesman.85 Derby, 
by contrast, was largely lacking in prescience, while the verdict on Disraeli was mixed. 
Bagehot thought him prone to ‘stupendous blunders’ because of recklessness, but Reid 
disagreed: ‘he does possess in a very high degree the foresight and the accuracy of judgment 
which are necessary to make a man a really great statesman’. When the leading Liberal 
ministers were tempted to support the South in the American Civil War, he had the 
prescience to see that the North must win.
86
 He was also credited him with recognising that 
parliamentary reform might help rather than hinder the progress of Conservatism.
87
 In the 
case of Gladstone, some – such as the Pall Mall Gazette – diagnosed a ‘want of prescience’: 
he might gauge the moment accurately, but he could not succeed in ‘forecasting the future’.88 
In an otherwise positive account, Bryce agreed that he showed ‘less than was needed of that 
prescience which is, after integrity and courage, the highest gifts of a statesman’.89 An 
accurate calculation of the consequences of any line of action was therefore a central 
component of effective statesmanship. 
 
Character and Communication 
 
Whether that calculation was successful was often only apparent in hindsight. To know 
whether to trust the judgment of politicians required something else: character. This referred 
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both to ‘the mental and moral qualities’ of an individual as well as to ‘moral qualities 
strongly developed’ and was distinct from the eighteenth-century ideal of ‘politeness’ which 
stressed merely the outer forms of sociability.
90
 By contrast a ‘man of character’ was 
supposed to demonstrate the coherence of qualities across private and public domains. 
Smiles’s Character explained the importance of will in overcoming the impulses of the lower 
self, and unpacked the constellation of ideals that exemplified character: duty, honesty, 
courage, work, energy, restraint and so on. Many of these were expected of public just as 
much as private individuals. Russell, for instance, spoke in 1854 of how the character of 
rulers ‘is a matter of utmost interest to the people of this country’. ‘It is, in fact, on the 
confidence reposed by people in the character of public men, that the security of this country 
in a great degree depends.’91 There were times when this idea seemed to be under attack, 
especially if the exponents of statesmanlike character seemed to be using it as cover for class 
governance. In a discussion of Earl Grey’s life, the Morning Chronicle in 1845 suggested that 
rulers were increasingly being judged by their legislative achievements: ‘If the ends be good 
... what matters it what this man is ... if he will effect some palpable utility.’ The reality, it 
went on, was that the character of public men lifted the character of the nation (‘patriotism is 
awakened, ambition purified, and the national character invigorated and ennobled’) and that 
this was more important than any specific financial or commercial reform.
92
 At times it was 
argued that such weight should not be placed on character – do we judge the quality of 
military leadership by the morals of a general?
93
 – but it was not displaced until the twentieth 
century. Morley’s biography of Walpole, for instance, concluded that he could not be ranked 
among the highest of statesmen because ‘in the world’s final estimation character goes farther 
than act, imagination than utility, and its leaders strike us as much by what they were as by 
what they did’.94 Whether Morley shared ‘the world’s estimation’ is not entirely clear, but it 
does show that character still counted for a good deal. 
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Accordingly, great importance was attached to personality. As Bagehot explained, 
‘political business, like all others, is not transacted by machines, but by living and breathing 
men, of various and generally strong characters, of various and often strong passions’.95 Since 
it was central to the idea of ‘character’ that the lower self could be disciplined, the balance of 
elements in personality was crucial. Smiles insisted that temper mattered more than talent, 
and he outlined the ideal of an estimable man: cheerful, kind, patient, sympathetic. Such a 
person could cope easily with the trials life threw at him. Other characteristics needed to be 
guarded against. A man of strong temper, for instance, should take care to control and direct 
it in order to avoid ‘fitful outbreaks of passion’. Similarly, manners mattered: a rude man 
may be good at heart, but he would be more ‘agreeable’ and ‘probably a much more useful’ 
man if he adopted ‘suavity of disposition and courtesy of manner’.96 These maxims applied 
equally to public as to private life, and political biography frequently indulged in speculations 
about how personal character had affected political fortune. 
 There were recurring criticisms applied to leading politicians. Surprisingly, a common 
complaint was coldness. Pitt had a touch of this, but the exemplary cases were two leading 
Whigs. A gentle man in private, in public Grey had a ‘cold, harsh, arrogant bearing’.97 This 
reputation outlived the man, with later writers noting ‘stately manners ... aloof ... somewhat 
cold’, and summing up his character as ‘cold, reserved, and proud’.98 Russell fared little 
better. If there was ‘Tropical warmth’ in his political beliefs, there was ‘Arctic temperature in 
his manners’.99 He was incapable of the geniality necessary to popularity: ‘There is an icy 
tone in his voice and glitter in his eye’.100 His ‘cold hauteur’ was frequently commented on, 
and it was argued that his pride made his relations with other politicians fraught, especially 
from the 1850s.
101
 Peel was also a difficult character, marked by pride and sensitivity, and 
‘impenetrable reserve’.102 He rarely employed humour, and his aloofness from fellow MPs – 
‘a freezing bow’ – was recorded anecdotally. One explanation was extreme shyness which he 
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combated with ‘an artificial manner, haughtily stiff, or exuberantly bland’.103 Peel’s 
diffidence was not to be confused with patrician reserve, which, it was thought, hampered 
Salisbury’s popularity. Indeed his ‘impersonality’ led some to accuse him of lacking 
knowledge of other men.
104
 
 But class and character were not indivisible. Melbourne and Palmerston were both 
exemplars of aristocratic affability, and if in the former case ‘thorough manliness’ and ‘easy 
temperament’ were insufficient to rescue his reputation, in the latter they seemed integral.105 
Palmerston’s ‘bonhommie’ was crucial because ‘a good-tempered, jolly man can never be 
unpopular’.106 Numerous commentators fixated on his geniality, humour and sociability – it 
was his personality which had at times enabled his government to survive when in other 
hands it would have fallen.
107
 This social tact, however, did not mean he was weak statesman. 
While Melbourne had taken ‘the light treatment’ of politics too far, Palmerston got the 
balance right. The public saw a ‘manly and masculine hardness of grain’ that enjoyed a good 
fight, and stood up for friends.
108
 Disraeli tried to pose in the same garments. He could deal 
with bores or avoid difficult questions ‘with one of those happy phrases or pleasant jests 
which Lord Palmerston loved so dearly’.109 Later writers spoke of his patience, temper, 
cheerfulness, and above all wit.
110
 Even the Daily News, which reprobated his policies, spoke 
warmly of his ‘indomitable courage, the unflagging energy, the marvellous tact and skill and 
knowledge of mankind’.111 Nevertheless, the themes of class and race were never far from the 
surface when, perhaps more than other politicians, he was criticised for artificiality and 
theatricality, and for constructing a personality which appealed to the Commons, and enabled 
his ambition to soar.
112
 
 The fact that there were no narrow set of traits which enabled or prevented political 
success is evident in the case of Gladstone. In the 1850s he was judged to have a ‘delicate 
and fine’ mind with a ‘subtle and refining’ temperament which would make him unsuitable 
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for leadership.
113
 Moreover, in comparison to Peel or Palmerston, he did not seem ‘safe’: he 
had a ‘fluctuating’ temperament which could be ‘hot and hasty’ but also sometimes 
‘indecisive’.114 In opposition he was prone to take the controversial side of a question thereby 
revealing an ‘enthusiastic’ and ‘impulsive’ character. His supporters lived in fear of where his 
‘eccentricity’ might take them: his overbearing – even arrogant – style rarely condescended 
to explain to his rank and file.
115
  Indeed, he knew little about how to conciliate, and so was a 
failure in managing individuals. The fact that he seemed largely incapable of humour and 
adopted a solemn tone only seemed to make this worse. Even amid all the panegyrics in 
1898, it was felt that he had struggled to contain a hot temper to the point that he could easily 
be goaded by his opponents.
116
 Given the centrality of the idea of Disraeli as ‘alien’, it is 
striking that Gladstone – for all his oratorical brilliance and administrative achievement – 
could also be seen as uncomfortably strange. Certainly a number of writers thought his 
‘serious failings’ of temperament and character were indicative of a lack of the manliness 
required of politicians.
117
  
The final quality required of statesmen was the ability to persuade the audiences that 
mattered. This was largely understood in terms of oratory.
118
 James Mackintosh explained 
that as the power of public opinion grew so the ‘faculty of persuading men to support or 
oppose political measures’ became central, and so excellent debating skills were actually a 
rather good test of political ability.
119
 Macaulay, similarly, argued that while early modern 
politicians oriented themselves to the court, since the Restoration the talent for speaking had 
developed: ‘It has stood in the place of all other acquirements. It has covered ignorance, 
weakness, rashness, the most fatal maladministration.’120 To develop the discussion further, 
three themes may be stressed. First, the nature and success of particular styles of speaking; 
second, the implications of emerging audiences; and third, controversy about the effects of 
oratory. 
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Oratory was typically evaluated – especially in the first half of the century – 
according to classical models. An exemplary speaker might be praised for his command of 
language, the use of ‘ornament’, and the arrangement of the argument. Considerable attention 
was paid to the manner of delivery: it should be graceful, easy, ‘unaffected and unforced’, 
and the speaker should be in control of his ‘action, gesture, expression and elocution’.121 
Certain styles once favoured – for instance the ‘theatrical effect’ of the elder Pitt – were 
thought to be old-fashioned by the 1830s.
122
 Similarly, Disraeli’s maiden speech was 
drowned out in laughter because its ‘exaggerated attitude and diction’ seemed to be 
idiosyncratic.
123
 What really mattered, however, was that a speaker was persuasive. For this 
reason, prepared speeches would not get one far. They might demonstrate the powers of 
reason and imagination, but not a talent for political leadership.
124
 Macaulay himself, 
according to the Morning Chronicle, was all ‘simulated fervour and laboured spontaneity’ 
which looked hollow compared to Peel’s style.125 A much better ideal was Gladstone who, 
according to Bryce, could speak effectively with very limited notice, and was also able – 
unlike even excellent orators such as Pitt and Fox – both to open and close a debate. 
Significant attention was given to the emotional power of a speech. Pitt ‘transported’ 
his audience, and Fox could sway and enthuse them.
126
 In an early essay on Gladstone, 
Bagehot accepted that he was a fine speaker with superb command of language, but, he 
asked, ‘Did the audience feel? were they excited? did they cheer?’127 By the time of his death 
no one doubted the answers to these questions, and the almost ‘magical’ quality of his effects 
on audiences was widely noted. It was frequently argued that the root of Gladstone’s appeal 
was the power and depth of his earnestness, and indeed this was an important quality for a 
speaker.
128
 Canning, for example, made very effective use of wit, but his lightness and fancy 
sometimes became ‘too exuberant’ and the audience assumed he was not being earnest.129 
Disraeli’s success as a speaker was also achieved at some cost to his reputation as an orator. 
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He was certainly skilful, and knew how to perform a variety of roles – defiant, surprising, 
savage – and even though one could tell it was a performance, it nevertheless often worked 
on his parliamentary audience.
130
 He could charm them, and his use of humour, and 
especially sarcasm, was thought a crucial ingredient of his success. But, as The Times argued, 
‘If earnestness is the soul of oratory, it would be strange indeed if we could bestow higher 
praise than brilliancy on most of the speeches of Mr Disraeli’.131 Bryce developed the point, 
arguing that his failure in the true index of eloquence – ‘the power of touching the emotions’ 
– was evident in that while he could make men laugh, he could not make them cry.132 
Less accomplished speakers could still prove effective. Melbourne, for example, was 
the target of considerable abuse – even on his death – for his indistinct, halting, and 
stumbling delivery. Yet his defenders turned this to his advantage – he was not capable of 
‘sustained flights of eloquence’ because he disliked rhetoric and exaggeration. Instead he was 
commended for simplicity and truthfulness which spoke directly and powerfully to an 
audience. ‘To gain a political character, it is not always necessary to be speech-making’ – 
such arguments drew, as we shall see, on enduring suspicions about the dangers of oratorical 
display.
133
 Perhaps the best instance of a comparatively poor speaker who excelled as a 
politician was Palmerston. He was not ‘graceful’ and to the end of his life there was 
‘hesitancy’ while he searched for the right word.134 He had never ‘scaled the heights of 
oratory’; there was no ‘dazzling light’ – he was ‘skilful at fence’ but no more.135 Sometimes 
he offended because of excessive vulgarity, but in general he was clever enough rarely to 
open himself to dangerous positions, and he employed ridicule and diversion effectively. He 
could make the House laugh and cheer and when necessary adopt a ‘sham enthusiasm’ that 
gave the impression of conviction. He was a partisan, a debater who could manage the House, 
but never aspired – when ‘appealing to the passions or developing the policy of the hour’ – to 
be an orator who could transcend the practicality of the moment.
136
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 By mid-century it was widely agreed that the style of oratory had evolved to suit the 
needs of the age. In an essay on Gladstone, Ritchie noted the comparative absence of wit, and 
suggested that ‘oratorical display’ was less sought after in the Commons. That era had 
culminated in Canning, but was now over: the Commons had become ‘a business 
assembly’.137 The lodestone for this argument was Peel. In 1845 G. H. Francis argued that the 
traditional purposes of oratory – to excite passions, to sway judgment, to delight mankind – 
were being supplanted because since 1832 the Commons had become more ‘business-like’, 
and so powerful speakers attended more to ‘immediate utility’ than to lasting beauty. Peel 
was adept at this, and hence will be classed ‘among the statesmen than among the orators’. 
This type of leader had to be ready with facts and figures, able to understand all shades of 
opinion, and capable of explaining himself clearly, or concealing himself effectively, as 
appropriate. The speeches of Peel were typified by ‘common sense’ rather than being marked 
for ‘vivid imagination or profound thought’.138 Obituarists agreed that Peel’s speeches were 
‘like himself, practical’ and that their eloquence ‘consisted in their persuasiveness’.139 
Bagehot developed these points into a central argument. In an age of business there was no 
need to awaken deep passions, and so Peel’s oratory was perfect for the time because he 
aimed to explain rather than to charm or amuse. Ironically he was better suited to the 
reformed Commons – a style more appropriate to its unreformed incarnation was Canning’s 
‘easy fluency ... nice wit ... passing from topic to topic, like the raconteur of the dinner 
table’.140 The idea that Peel represented a transition was repeatedly affirmed by later writers. 
Justin McCarthy saw in him the passing away of the eloquence of Pitt and Fox, and that from 
thereon any speaker needed ‘a good deal of business-precision and practicality’.141 In this 
respect Gladstone managed to combine the command and elevation of an orator, with the 
mastery of detail needed for a business age. 
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 The second point about oratory is related: discussion of the opportunities and effects 
of new audiences. As Macaulay argued, at the time of the elder Pitt the fame of a speaker 
depended entirely on those who heard him in Parliament and so his style and manner were 
crucial. Since then the reporting of speeches gave the politician two separate audiences. The 
one in Parliament might be ‘pleased or disgusted’ by his voice and action, but over the 
breakfast table shrill tones and uncouth gestures became irrelevant.
142
 A successful politician 
in the 1830s and 40s tried to transcend this division. Within a generation, the problem 
became more marked as politicians took to the platform. Bagehot, in a review of Gladstone’s 
speech at Greenwich in 1871, argued that it inaugurated an era when one of the prime 
minister’s ‘most important qualifications’ would be ‘to exert a direct control over the 
masses’. A statesman who could do this would have a ‘vast’ advantage, and while 
parliamentarians might be uneasy about these trends, they would soon understand the need to 
become popular orators and to deal in ‘the broad, easy, and animated style’ which touches the 
people rather than the ‘subtle flavours’ of parliamentary oratory.143 Gladstone became the 
master of ‘this branch of rhetoric’, and few others were judged to be nearly as successful.144 
Disraeli’s influence was restricted to Parliament, and he actively disliked speaking to large 
audiences.
145
 Salisbury, similarly, was thought to be less effective outdoors. He had a strong 
aversion to the ‘arts of the demagogue’ and was not one to ‘conjure’ with the country.146 His 
speeches were ‘models of polished irony and effective declamation’, but they excited no 
enthusiasm from wide audiences.
147
 Yet, as Bryce noted in an essay on Northcote, it was the 
‘power of moving crowds’ that the younger generation of politicians seemed especially to 
value.
148
 
 The third theme was both old and new, as the rise of the platform gave a more 
pronounced edge to some traditional criticisms of the art of oratory. Three connected points 
should be highlighted. First was the concern – especially among the high-minded – that the 
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stress on public speaking in an adversarial system tended to undermine interest in and pursuit 
of the truth. Bagehot frequently articulated this anxiety, and cited Macaulay’s argument that 
popular government encouraged eager young minds to mount arguments that no man of sense 
would ever make.
149
 The net effect over time was to debase the reasoning faculties. The art of 
debating was very quickly separated from the capacity for belief, and this pressure was 
merely exacerbated by the widespread expectation that cabinet ministers had a ‘ready, 
producible, defensible view of all great questions’.150 A second anxiety was whether oratory 
actually undermined the conditions of statesmanship. Since politicians were trained to excel 
in speechifying and debating, they could sometimes be constitutionally unfit to manage a 
department and lead the nation. Carlyle, as we have seen, expressed these doubts in extreme 
form, but Greg in the 1850s could also be found wondering whether ‘the talking and acting 
faculties’ were really compatible.151 The third theme was nicely expressed by Bryce: if 
Parliament was ‘not a good place’ for the pursuit of truth, ‘the platform is still less favourable 
to that quest’.152 This was the old problem of demagoguery. An ambitious man might use 
‘mean arts and unreasonable clamours’ – the phrase was Macaulay’s153 – to rouse popular 
passions for his own factious ends. In the first half of the century Henry Hunt, O’Connell, 
and Bright were frequently painted in this light. They were routinely called demagogues and 
their style of speaking contrasted with the parliamentary art required of a true statesman. 
With the rise of the platform, however, the two realms blended, and it became easier to 
accuse established politicians of succumbing to demagoguery. Opponents of Gladstone found 
this a compelling line of argument. One such pamphleteer went so far as to argue that ‘first-
class oratory is only a theatrical entertainment’ and that ‘really great statesmen’ were 
generally merely good speakers rather than exemplary orators.
154
 By the end of the century, 
then, oratory was still assumed to be an essential ingredient of leadership, but it now also 
26 
 
attracted anxiety – a statesman could not avoid speaking to the people, but he had to take care 
how he went about it. 
 
In ‘British Statesmanship in 1905’ F. W. Raffety argued that the recent death of Harcourt 
marked a ‘severance’ in parliamentary tradition: ‘with him departed nearly the last of a 
school of statesmanship which seems to be passing away before there is discovered any clear 
evidence of one that is to take its place’. Certainly, Edwardian leaders were of a much 
younger generation than the Victorian titans they had so recently replaced. Still, one does not 
need to share Raffety’s partisan criticisms of Conservative failings to recognise that the terms 
he used were very familiar. He criticised the government for a lack of settled convictions and 
administrative ability. There was little sign of earnestness: expediency and opportunism ruled 
the roost. Some might argue for an infusion of business skills, but this missed the point – 
there ought to be ‘an elevation of thought and object’ that lifted the statesman above the level 
of the merchant. A particular anxiety – increasingly common in the Edwardian era – has been 
a central theme of this chapter. ‘It is not assiduity in public service’, demonstrated by ‘long 
observation and study of public affairs or acquaintance with the history and constitution of 
the country’, that was rewarded, but personal popularity. This, Raffety lamented, was often 
achieved through, among other things, exploiting sporting connections. Bryce, as we have 
seen, thought the voting nation was tested and proven by the leaders it chose. Raffety feared 
that at present the ‘character and pretensions’ of parliamentary aspirants were unlikely to 
change until ‘the electors recognise that they require and must have a class of men ... quite 
different to the president of a football club’.155 
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